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RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation; RICHFIELD CITY 
COUNCIL, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah; KENDRICK 
HARWARD, individually and in 
his capacity as Mayor of 
Richfield City and as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
GLEN OGDEN, individually and 
in his official capacity as a 
member of the Richfield City 
Council; KAY KIMBALL, 
individually and in his 
official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
REX WARENSKI, individually and 
in his official capacity as a 
member of the Richfield City 
Council; DUANE WILSON, 
individually and in his 
official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
NAD BROWN, individually and in 
official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
WOODY FARNSWORTH, individually 
and in his official capacity 
as a member of the Richfield 
City Council; and DOES I 
through V, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION 
FOR CERTIORARI TO 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 890347 
Court of Appeals No. 880713-CA 
Priority No. 13 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 43 (1) through (4) of the Utah Supreme Court, 
attached hereto as Appendix p. ii. 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same 
of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a 
way that is in conflict with the decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Title 52
 f Chapter 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended (Open and Public Meeting Act): 
*** 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
*** 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that 
are scheduled in advance over the course of a year 
shall give public notice at least once each year of its 
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. 
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and 
place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Sub-
section (1) of this section, each public body shall 
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the 
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
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(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal 
office of the public body, or if no such office 
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be 
held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of 
general circulation within the geographic 
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local 
media correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is 
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent 
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) 
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable 
given. No such emergency meeting of a public body 
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify 
all of its members and a majority votes in the 
affirmative to hold the meeting. 
*** 
52-4-8. Suit to void final action - Limitation-
Exceptions. 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be 
commenced within 90 days after the action except that 
with respect to any final action concerning the 
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days 
after the action. 
*** 
Title 42, 1983, U. S. Code (Civil Rights Act): 
1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. (R.S. 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P.L. 96-170, 1, 
93 Stat. 1284.) 
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Laws of Utah 1987, Chapter 207: 
AN ACT RELATING TO CITIES AMD TOWNS; DEFINING THE 
POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS TO APPOINT AND REMOVE PUBLIC 
SAFETY DEPARTMENT HEAD; DEFINING WHEN A PUBLIC SAFETY 
DEPARTMENT HEAD MAY DISCIPLINE A SUBORDINATE; AND 
MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 10-3-916, AS LAST AMENDED BY THE CHAPTER 33, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
REPEALS: 10-3-911, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 48, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1977 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 10-3-916, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
10-3-916. Recorder, treasurer, marshal in cities of 
third class and towns. 
(1) In each city of the third class and town^ on or 
before the first Monday in February following a 
municipal election^ the mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified 
person to each of the offices of city recorder [ 7-] and 
treasurer [;—and-mars-hatl] . 
(2) The city recorder [aha-tlr-fo^ ] is ex officio the 
city auditor and shall perform the duties of [sn±eh] 
that office. 
(3) The mayor, with the advice and consent of the 
council, may also appoint and fill vacancies in all 
[src*eb-eff±eers~atrcl--agents—a-&-may--be] offices provided 
for by law or ordinance [;—exeept-as-etherwise-pirev-ided 
by-taw] . 
(4) All appointed officers shall continue in office 
until their successors are appointed and qualified. 
Section 2. Section Repealed. 
Section 10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed. 
Section 10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
10-3-911. Repealed. 
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Section 10-3-916, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
10-3-916• Appointment of recorder and treasurer in 
cities of third class and towns - Vacancies in office. 
(1) In each city of the third class and town, on or 
before the first Monday in February following a 
municipal election, the mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified 
person to each of the offices of city recorder and 
treasurer, 
(2) The city recorder is ex officio the city auditor 
and shall perform the duties of that office. 
(3) The mayor, with the advice and consent of the 
council, may also appoint and fill vacancies in all 
offices provided for by law or ordinance. 
(4) All appointed officers shall continue in office 
until their successors are appointed and qualified. 
Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772-774 (Utah 1984), attache 
hereto as Appendix pp. iii.l through iii.3. 
Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 75 S.Ct. 
614, 99 L.Ed. 897 (Iowa 1955), attached hereto as Appendix pp. 
iv.1 through iv.7. 
Southern Pacific vs. Industrial Commission, 91 P. 2d 700 (Arizona 
1939), attached hereto as Appendix pp. v.l through v.6. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. This is not a proper case for certiorari. 
(a) The case for which review is sought is both 
academic and episodic. 
(b) There are no justiciable issues about the 
Open and Public Meetings Act (Title 52, 
Chapter 4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; 
["Sunshine Law"]). 
(c) Richfield City's conduct demonstrates neither 
past nor present intention to violate the 
Sunshine Law. 
(d) Richfield City complied superabundantly with 
the Sunshine Law. 
2. This Supreme Court has previously decided any 
pertinent issues of entitlement to or property 
interest in future employment. 
3. Petitioner is still raising matters never urged 
before the Court of original jurisdiction or in 
any providing except for the first time before the 
Court of Appeals.1 
1
 So-called "Richfield City Policy Department, Policies and 
Procedures Manual", a document written by Ward for his 
subordinates without foundational evidence (of which there is 
none) that it was ever adopted as an organic or legislative act 
of Richfield City. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[STATEMENT OF THE CASE] 
The Petitioner will be referred to as "Ward" and the 
Respondents will be referred to collectively as "Richfield". 
This is an action in which Ward seeks $250,000.00 in 
general damages, $250,000.00 punitive damages, reinstatement as 
Chief of Police, attorneys1 fees and other relief for his 
dismissal as Richfield1s Chief of Police. 
At a meeting held April 2, 1981 which was in complete 
compliance with the Open and Public Meeting Act (Chapter 4 Title 
52 "Sunshine Law") Richfield terminated Ward as its Chief of 
Police. Ward threatened a lawsuit because his dismissal was not 
specifically mentioned on the agenda for the April 2nd meeting; 
therefore, on June 8, 1981 Richfield held a meeting under a 
posted and published agenda which specifically enumerated for 
consideration the proposal to terminate Ward as Chief of Police. 
Immediately before this meeting Richfield was served with a 
Temporary Restraining Order which the District Judge later held 
should not have been issued or at its best (i.e.: if it ever had 
any validity) expired by its own terms. The District Court was 
of the opinion that §10-3-911, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 applied 
to 3rd class cities, divesting the court of jurisdiction, and the 
restraining order should not have issued. The no-jurisdiction 
ruling was reversed in Ward vs. Richfield Citv, et al„ [Ward I] 716 P. 2d 
265 (Utah 1984) . We do not dispute the correctness of that 
Decision. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ward wants this Court of last resort to review a fully 
considered and eminently well-reasoned, unanimous decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed a Summary Judgment based on 
uncontradicted affidavits before the District Court. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
As stated in Nature of the Case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
As stated in Nature of the Case. (The Decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals dated June 14, 1989 is attached hereto as 
Appendix pp. i.l - i.7.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 43 does not suggest Certiorari in this Case. 
The Petitioner is asking review by Certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals whose thoroughly well-reasoned Opinion treated and 
correctly applied all pertinent Utah statutory and common law and 
federal and state precedents from all jurisdictions, especially 
cases of the Utah Supreme Court which are stare decisis. This case 
has neither special nor important dimension sufficiently 
significant to warrant review by certiorari. 
2. Utah's Open and Public Meeting ("Sunshine") Law was 
not offended and needs no further interpretation by the Court; 
especially as applied to this Case. The facts in this case do 
8 
not involve or even suggest, let alone draw into question, any 
ambiguity in the Sunshine Law, As the Court of Appeals held, 
even if a technical violation occurred (which the Court of 
Appeals held did not) it was promptly cured by appropriate-
though quite possibly unnecessary - action by the City Council, 
(Appendix p. i.4) 
3. The Utah Supreme Court has decided all tenure 
issues relevant to this case. Specifically in Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 
692 P.2d 772-774 (Utah 1984), (Appendix pp. iii.l - iii.3) and in 
other cases the Utah Supreme Court has held broadly and without 
limitation that a Chief of Police has no right to notice, hearing 
or a showing of cause on his dismissal. 
4. The Municipal Code (Title 10, U.C.A., 1953) has 
been amended in many particulars making questions concerning the 
Code moot. The position held by Ward, "marshall" in a third 
class city, is no longer a statutory office. Construction of the 
statute under which Ward claims would be the interpretation by 
this Court of a repealed statute with no prospective precedential 
consequence. 
5. "Rules and Regulations" under which Ward claims 
tenure are neither supported by foundation nor proof of adoption; 
were raised for the first time on appeal. Ward attempts self-
levitation by asserting (for the first time on appeal) that rules 
which he had personally authored gave him an expectancy of future 
employment or a right to a hearing, and requiring at that 
hearing, cause for dismissal. These "Rules" were never adopted 
9 
by the city legislators or otherwise acted upon by the City 
Council. They were rules composed by Ward by which he proposed 
to govern his subordinates; and they do not even purport to 
govern or by the most extreme extension affect the Chief of 
Police (Marshal). 
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BRIEF OPPOSING CERTIORARI 
Come now the Respondents, Richfield City, et al., and 
respectfully oppose the granting of Certiorari in the captioned 
case upon the grounds and for the following Reasons: 
REASON I. CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE 
FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 
43 OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Rule 43 of the Utah Supreme Court ("Rule 43") codifies 
the sound principle that review by writ of certiorari will be 
granted 
"only where there are special and important 
reasons therefor." [Supra pp. 1, 2 and 
Infra; Appendix ii] 
The enumeration of the indicators found in sub-
paragraphs (1) through (4) of Rule 43, although "neither 
controlling nor measuring [the Supreme] Court's discretion", 
exclude Petitioner's case from the slightest justification for 
consideration on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 
By making arguments of ineligibility for certiorari 
Respondents both respectfully and emphatically do not concede 
that the Court of Appeals has decided this case incorrectly. 
The United States Supreme Court under its Rule 17 
(similar to Rule 43) in Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 
70, 75 S.Ct. 614, 99 L.Ed. 897 said: 
A federal question raised by a petitioner may 
be "of substance" in the sense that, 
abstractly considered, it may present an 
intellectually interesting and solid problem. 
But this Court does not sit to satisfy a 
scholarly interest in such issues. Nor does 
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it sit for the benefit of the particular 
litigants. [Citations] "Special and important 
reasons" imply a reach to a problem beyond 
the academic or the episodic. 
This case is both academic because the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the office of Sheriff (concomitant to that of 
a Chief of Police) is subject to the appointing power's authority 
to d ismiss without hearing, n o t i c e or cause, Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 
692 P.2d 772 - 774 (Utah 1984); and episodic, because the rulings 
only touch upon the Sunshine Law in the most tangential way; 
i.e.: Ward was dismissed at a meeting when that particular action 
was not specifically on the agenda. If his dismissal does not 
require a hearing, notice or cause then it does not need to be 
the subject of formal action and therefor not the object of an 
agenda. Then, because Ward wanted to martial support by means of 
the Sunshine Law (in his words) "significantly [to] influence the 
public body" (Brief p. 11) , the City accommodated him with a 
posted and media-published agenda only to be met with an ex parte 
Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter "TRO") interpreted by 
Ward to say that the City could not attempt to hold a legal 
meeting to dismiss him. Counsel handled this part of the case 
disingenuously. [Ex-parte] He could easily have made contact 
with the City's attorney - he has been calling him regularly to 
attempt settlement - but chose not to tell him that he was either 
seeking or serving a TRO; rather, he chose to have it obtained on 
June 7, 1981, and served just a few minutes before the June 8th 
meeting without prior notice to the City or its attorney. The 
Trial Judge protected the City against chaos by striking from the 
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TRO, proposed and submitted to him by Ward's counsel, the words 
"•••plaintiff [Ward] be and he is hereby reinstated as Chief of 
Police pending a determination of the legal issues involved in 
this litigation by this court." After carefully reading the 
Court-stricken sentence and the remainder of the TRO, the City 
went about carefully not to violate it but only ratified what the 
Council had done previously. The TRO told the City to do nothing 
further to terminate Ward. 
The City appeared in obedience to the Show Cause 
Injunction of the TRO and the trial court dismissed the action. 
This Court, as the Brief states, did reverse that ruling but only 
on the ground that the Trial Court had erred in its holding that 
it had no jurisdiction. We do not argue, but to the contrary 
agree, with that result. 
This case went to the Federal Court purporting to be a 
civil rights action where the U.S. District Court held that the 
Civil Rights Act (Title 42 §1983, U.S. Code) will not be invoked 
to redress violations of a State statute (here the Sunshine Law) 
and also, to the extent that Amendment XIV to the United States 
Constitution interdicts confiscatory action, that Ward had no 
property right in his previously held office as a Chief of 
Police; neither did he suffer loss of liberty through defamation 
of his character. [Per Winder, Judge, U.S. District Court for 
Utah, (Appendix pp. vii.l - vii.9)] 
This is about as episodic as a bi-jurisdictionally 
dismissed case can become. 
13 
The Sioux City case (349 U.S. at 74) talks about a 
demonstration that the public body was "willful" in its intent to 
deny a constitutional right (per Justice Frankfurter) "***at 
least four members of the Court deemed that despite the rather 
[sic] unique circumstances of the case Iowa's willingness to 
enforce the restrictive covenant rendered it 'special and 
important'". [Emphasis added] 
Richfield always acted without animosity but contrarily 
with the highest concern and deference not only for Ward's legal 
rights but also for his professional career. 
The record is replete with the Richfield City Council's 
repeated attempts to try to get Ward to change the possessive 
regimentation of his policemen and other subordinate officers 
that characterized his tenure; to "mend his ways"; relax his 
stiffness and get along with law enforcement work. One 
uncontradicted affidavit said the Mayor and Council "entreated" 
Ward to relax his irresiliency so that he would be sufficiently 
tractable to work with his men for the good of everyone, 
including Ward. The Mayor and Council interviewed Ward at least 
at the first (the challenged April 2, 1S)81) meeting instructing 
him to be less abrasive and militant in his attempts at 
discipline or compulsory esprit de corps. 
Holding a special meeting for which a super-abundant 
effort was made to comply with the Open and Public Meeting Act 
(Chapter 4, Title 52, U.C.A. 1953, as amended) is demonstrative 
of a willingness on the part of Richfield City to observe 
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sedulously the Sunshine Law. The City Council gave Ward 
everything he asked for respecting notice and opportunity to be 
heard even though some of this may have been legally superfluous. 
We respectfully represent to the Court that we are not 
in any respect fearful of Petitioner's challenge fully to brief, 
argue and present this case to the Court on certiorari; however, 
it is one not deserving of this Court's attention. 
It certainly does not fall within Ward's description of 
the lower appellate court's treatment of the case where counsel 
states that: 
The high standards of the Utah State judicial 
system and the rights of the Appellant demand 
a more professional analysis. [Brief of Ward 
on Petition for Rehearing before the Court of 
Appeals, p. 15; (Appendix vii)] 
We have the highest respect for this Court in its 
office as the last resort for all appeals. We have similar 
regard for the perspicacity and scholarship of the Court of 
Appeals. We think that Ward might be correct that this Court may 
organize an unexampled professional analysis; and at the same 
time we do not think that this degree of excellence, the 
finiteness of time, and the purposes for which the Court of 
Appeals was established justify certiorari to that Court of this 
single-issue, episodic case. 
This would be to review private litigation; in some 
respects to be merely advisory, to speculate on what the Sunshine 
Law means in respects not before this Court and re-constructing 
what opinion the District Court held regarding his own Order to 
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Show Cause when he has already articulated what he thought of it 
on re-examination. 
REASON II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CITY. 
The Court of Appeals correctly, irrespective of the 
disparaging remarks made by Ward in his Petition for Certiorari, 
made a scholarly analysis of the Sunshine Law. They said (p. 4 
of the Opinion [Appendix p. i.4]) 
Second, even if technical violations had 
occurred in the April meeting, they were 
subsequently cured. On June 5, notice of the 
special session scheduled for June 8 was 
provided to the local newspaper and the radio 
station in compliance with the agenda and 
notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The 
agenda for the June 8 meeting included Ward's 
discharge and the media was notified more 
than twenty-four hours in advance. At the 
June meeting, the Council voted without 
opposition to ratify its actions taken at the 
April meeting. Ward argues that the action 
taken at the June meeting violated the 
temporary restraining order.2 The order 
restrained the Council from taking further 
action against him. Richfield City argues 
that the June meeting merely ratified action 
that had already been taken and, therefore, 
was not new action. 
In a proceeding for violation of an 
injunction, it is generally held that the 
extent of the punishment rests in the sound 
discretion of the court. See Hensley v. 
Board of Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 
184, 189 (1972); People v. Mulgrew. 19 111. 
App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). 
"The inherent power of a court rendering a 
permanent injunction to enforce its decree 
and to modify or revoke the injunction for 
equitable reasons due to changed conditions 
is generally recognized . . . ." Mulgrew, 
311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial court held that 
it was not in the public's best interest to 
void the action taken by the Council in 
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terminating Ward. We will not disturb 
judgments in injunction proceedings that rest 
within the sound discretion of the trier of 
facts, unless an abuse of discretion clearly 
appears from the record. See Hensley, 504 
P.2d at 188. 
2Ward asserts that he would have mobilized 
supporters had he known the Council 
planned on taking action despite the 
temporary restraining order. However, 
the Council was under no duty to notify 
Ward personally of its intended action. 
REASON III. THE CLAIMED MERITS OF THIS CASE ARE 
ACADEMIC, HAVING BEEN DECIDED BY 
HUTCHISON VS. CARTWRIGHT, 692 P. 2D 772 
(UTAH 1984). 
In Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772, (Utah, Nov. 14, 
1984) the Utah Supreme Court, and after it had decided the Ward I 
case, in a unanimous opinion held that in the absence of a 
statute requiring cause for dismissal the officer or board which 
had made the appointment has authority to suspend or dismiss the 
appointee (in Hutchison a jailer) "without charges, notice, or 
hearing", [emphasis supplied] because unless the statute on 
appointment or dismissal expressly so provides, that officer 
serves "at the pleasure" of the appointing authority. 
Hutchison claimed in his lawsuit that he had been 
dismissed by the sheriff who had no authority to effect the 
dismissal and primarily that he was entitled to notice and a 
hearing. 
Justice Zimmerman at pages 773 and 774 of 692 P. 2d 
writes: 
This issue was considered in Sheriff of Salt 
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Lake County vs. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 P.783 
(1928). There the Court dealt with the 
question of whether county commissioners 
could suspend or dismiss deputy sheriffs 
against the will of the sheriff. ***The 
Court stated that unless otherwise controlled 
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss 
is appurtenant to the power to appoint. When 
an individual is appointed by an official, 
"the office is held during the pleasure of 
the authority making the appointment and . . 
no notice or charges or hearings are 
required for the suspension or removal by the 
authority appointing the officer." 71 Utah 
at 596, 268 P. at 784. [Emphasis added] 
[For the Court's convenience we have attached a copy of 
the Hutchison Decision as Appendix pp. iii.l - iii.3] 
The Federal Court, although not controlling but 
nevertheless helpful, has said that Ward has no right to the 
expectancy of future employment by the City. 
REASON IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE MUNICIPAL CODE MAKE THE 
QUESTION PRESENTED HERE ABSTRACT AND THE 
ALREADY ABSTRACT QUESTION MOOT. 
The law respecting appointment and removal of public 
safety department heads in cities of the third class and towns 
has been sharply amended; so sharply that to write an opinion on 
the merits of this case would be to tr€>at an entirely academic 
and repealed, now hypothetical code provision (Laws of Utah 1987 
Chapter 207 [Senate Bill No. 154 passed February 25, 1987, 
effective April 27, 1987]). The enactment of this chapter 
eliminates any need for the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to 
interpret §10-3-916. Chapter 207 of the Forty-Sixth Legislature 
also repeals §10-3-911. In the United States Supreme Court case 
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of Rice vs. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, (supra) the pointlessness of 
reviewing by certiorari a lower court's interpretation of a 
superceded statute is emphasized (75 S.Ct. 617, 618, 349 U.S. 77-
79)• In the Rice case it is notable that the United States Supreme 
Court had already granted certiorari, nevertheless certiorari was 
dismissed as "improvidently granted11 (75 S.Ct. 618, 349 U.S. 77) 
and no decision made or opinion written. 
REASON V. THE SUNSHINE LAW DOES NOT MAKE ANY ACTION 
VOID. 
Section 52-4-8 states that "any final action taken in 
violation of §52-4-3 or §52-4-6 is voidable by a court of 
competent jurisdiction". No one can seriously suggest that the 
Sixth Judicial District Court does not possess jurisdictional 
competency. If municipal, administrative, legislative, or rule-
making action is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction it 
is ordinarily presumed that the court has broad and usually 
undisturbable discretion to apply a form of validity. Ordinarily 
an act, proceeding, or legislative measure, if "voidable", can be 
ratified (as in the case of the other party affected) or affirmed 
(as in the case of the party whose act is deficient) Southern Pacific 
vs. Industrial Commission. 91 P. 2d 700 (Arizona 1939); however, 
in this case the legislature expressly chose the term "voidable" 
to be distinguished from the word "void". We make this statement 
largely in response to Ward's assertion that the action of April 
2nd was "void" and therefore irremediable. Although of minor 
consequence we make the counter-argument that the statute itself 
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contemplates circumstances where the action can be remedied by 
reaffirmation or ratification. Even where the word "void" is 
employed by the legislature it is ordinarily construed by the 
courts as having the more liberal meaning of "voidable". Southern 
Pacific vs. Industrial Commission, 91 P. 2d 700 (Arizona 1939). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully suggest that 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah not issue a Writ of 
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals; this case not having 
dimensions either "special" or "important" under Rule 43, Rules 
of The Utah Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McX|T & CHAMBERLAIN 
BY. 
Ken Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari were mailed to 
George E. Brown, Jr. Attorney for Petitioner, 7001 South 900 
East, Suite 240, Midvale, Utah (84047), by U.S. regular mail, 
postage prepaid, this 7th day of Septembe^ v. 1989. 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This appeal concerns whether 
properly dismissed as Richfield C 
claimed below that the Utah Open 
violated, that the Richfield City 
temporary restraining order by ta 
action to dismiss him as Chief of 
for an administrative appeal was 
court granted summary judgment in 
affirm. 
appellant, Boyd Ward, was 
ity Chief of Police. Ward 
and Public Meetings Act was 
Council disregarded a 
king further subsequent 
Police, and that his request 
improperly denied. The trial 
favor of Richfield City. We 
FACTS 
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public 
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's 
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items 
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and 
invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief 
of Police. The Council was concerned about several recent 
resignations within the police department. Discussion of 
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate 
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to 
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981. 
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request to the 
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On 
June 5, 1981, the Council published notice that a special 
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions 
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda 
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion. 
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary 
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further 
action against him. Despite the temporary restraining order, 
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward. 
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary 
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal 
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911 
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or 
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed, 
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the 
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the 
service will be served thereby." 
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield City, 
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third 
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On 
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for 
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of 
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public 
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or 
the June 8 meeting. 
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the 
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting; 
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the 
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied 
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court 
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to 
reinstatement, back pay and damages. 
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT 
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), 
at the April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8 
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the 
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted 
openly. £££ Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n, 
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). Political subdivisions, as defined 
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal 
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601 
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each 
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of 
the open and public meetings law. 
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the 
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that 
such failure should void the action taken at the April 
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should 
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding 
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails 
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates 
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open 
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of 
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a 
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then 
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council 
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to 
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with 
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with 
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward. 
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the 
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward 
was taken.1 
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether 
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. 
Most of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but 
wanted to be advised if action were taken. 
Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the 
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice 
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the 
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the 
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda 
for the June 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media 
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the 
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify 
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the 
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary 
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from 
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues 
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already 
been taken and, therefore, was not new action. 
In a proceeding for violation of an injunction, it is 
generally held that the extent of the punishment rests in the 
sound discretion of the court. See Hensley v. Board of 
Education, 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v. 
Mulgrew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). The 
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to 
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for 
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally 
recognized . . . ." Mularew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial 
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to 
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We 
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest 
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an 
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See 
Hensley* 504 P.2d at 188. 
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE 
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council, 
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of 
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-916 (1981). This 
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwrioht, 692 P.2d 772, 
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise 
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is 
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he 
known the Council planned on taking action despite the 
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no 
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action. 
appurtenant to the power to appoint. "When an individual is 
appointed by an official# 'the office is held during the 
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no 
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension 
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.1" Id. at 
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comers, 
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law 
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no 
vested property interest in continued employment, and such 
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or 
hearing unless otherwise prescribed." Carlson v. Bratton, 681 
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an 
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs 
of police or city marshals in third class cities,3 
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and 
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward, 
without a hearing, notice or cause. 
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal 
his discharge under sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Section 
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and 
employees of municipalities, other than members of the police 
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation 
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as. 
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he 
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member 
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with 
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and 
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter 
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city 
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As 
3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section 
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed 
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class 
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly 
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class 
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not 
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without 
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the 
correct result. Therefore, the trial court*s application of 
section 10-6-32 was harmless error. 
Chief of Police, we hold that Hard is both a member of a 
"police department" and the head of that "department." 
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the 
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of 
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of 
section 10-3-1106 applies to "any officer." Because these 
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the 
purpose of the whole act, Jensen Y» Interroountain Health Care, 
IflSLu, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language 
"as hereinafter provided" in section 10-3-1105 specifically 
modifies the sections that follow. "Separate parts of [an] 
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the 
act." id. fiaa al&SL Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth«# 618 p.2d 
480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, "any officer" as appears in 
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in 
section 10-3-1105. 
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the 
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to 
carry out the policies of the mayor "[t]he position of chief 
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any 
other position in the police department for the obvious reason 
that the chief of police is in a position of making and 
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at 
1335. The result is there is no protected property interest 
in the position of chief of police, id. at 1337.4 
4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the 
"Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures 
Manual." The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a 
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary 
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police 
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield 
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically 
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of 
police and not to the chief himself. 
The summary judgment is affirmed. 
C2-U e£L±A~ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
880713-CA 7 
Rule 42 RC ;L£S OF i i «: t r \H SI T R E M E COI "R r 
TITLE VI JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees n-i" 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, t he review of a j u d g m e n t , an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of cer t iorar i to the S u p r e m e Cour t of U t a h 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
Hule 43, Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of r igh t , bu t of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, whi le ne i t he r controll ing nor wholly m e a s u r i n g t h e 
court 's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of t he Cour t of Appeals h a s rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of ano the r panel of the Coi irt of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Cour t of Appeals has rendered a decision t h a t 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervis ion; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective Ar->- ' 20, 1987.) 
Rule 4i, Certification aiid transmission of record; filing; 
parties, 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The ease then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of t h e m may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on cer t iorar i 
and involve identical or closely re la ted quest ions, it will suffice to file a single 
pet i t ion for a writ of cer t iorar i covering all the cases. 
4 '<"! ;» 
dec i s iun ol t he Ti* i a I »! uui I, , f lie Apt e IJ :i tit. hdK spent, beveid J 
years appealing the decision which was based upon the repealed 
statute. The high standards of the Utah Sfafn imdifial sysfp-m 
and the rights of" the Appellant demand a more professional 
analysis. 
B . : .  . • * . d 
respectfully request- ,f na* * .» t o n * * -..peals reconsider :*** 
decision in this case r\rA. i^le in favor of Aireliant as set 
fort h i n the p r e v i on s I: r: •? -1 .- . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this A I day of J Oft*- 1989. 
The attorney for Appellant Boyd A. Ward respectfully hereby 
certifies that this Petion for Rehearing is made ir: gocd faith 
without any intent to delay the proceedings herein. 
George 7E. Brown, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Boyd A- Ward 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of this 
Petition for Rehearing of Appellant were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this $% day of ?Turt*~~ , 1989, to the following 
Ken Chamberlain 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
D36:motiox I 
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was truly driving in a weaving pattern. 
He stated that during the high-speed chase 
defendant 'was kind of taking in the mid-
dle of the road all the say [sic], pretty well 
except he's [sic] once in awhile get just a 
little too close to the shoulder and it would 
pull him over" and that defendant "got too 
close to the shoulder of the road and we 
about lost it." It was unclear whether the 
officer was referring to the right or left 
shoulder. Certainly driving in the middle 
of the road but occasionally getting close to 
the right shoulder is consistent with how a 
person would drive at high speeds. This 
testimony does not describe a weaving pat-
tern where the driver goes from one side of 
the highway to the other or even from one 
lane to another. Officer Stoneking's testi-
mony, standing alone, is insufficient to sup-
port a guilty verdict. Accordingly, we re-
verse the conviction of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
We remand the case for a new trial on 
the charge of evading a police officer. No 
costs awarded. 
HALL,. CJ and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
SZ\ 
V_ > > v v w ** 
Clarence E, HUTCHISON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
V. 
C. Lynn CARTWRIGHT, Beaver County 
Sheriff, and Board of Commissioners of 
Beaver County, State of Utah, Defend 
ants and Respondents. 
^ 18954. 
Supreme i^-iir: -f • u r 
Nov 14, \v-\ 
County jailer brought action against 
county sheriff and board of commissioners 
alleging that he was wrongfully suspended 
and subsequently dismissed from his posi 
tion. The Fifth District Court, Beav<*r 
County, J. Harlan Burns,, J., entered suit*. 
mary judgment for defendants, and plain* 
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim» 
merman, J., held that: (1) sheriff had caua§ 
and authority to dismiss plaintiff withoq| 
concurrence of board of commissioners; (2) 
sheriff had not relinquished his power to 
summarily discharge by utilizing county 
grievance procedure as a mechanism for 
adjudicating issues raised by the terming 
tion;- and (3) plaintiffs suspension and dig. 
missal gave rise to no claims for violations 
of the open meetings law. 
Affirmed. 
1. Master and Servant e=30(4) 
Municipal Corporations <§=> 185(1) 
Prisons <3>7 
County jailer's conduct at deposition in 
civil action in which he was a defendant, 
which was marked by conflict with both 
plaintiffs attorney and attorney provided 
by court to represent him, provided cause 
for sheriff to dismiss him, 
2. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(3) 
Prisons <s=*7 
Sheriff, who had authority to hire 
county jailer, had authority to dismiss him 
without approval of county board of com-
missioners. 
3. Municipal Corporations §=>185(3) 
Prisons <5=*7 
Sheriffs choice to utilize county griev-
ance procedure as mechanism for adjudicat-
ing issues raised by his termination of t 
jailer did not constitute a relinquishment of 
his po\* er to summarily discharge. 
4. Counties <fc=>52 
Prisons <3=7 
Because sheriff had independent au-
thority to discharge county jailer for mis-
conduct or other cause, no action by county 
commissioners was necessary for jailer's 
suspension or dismissal to become effective 
and, therefore, any meetings held or ac-
tions taken by the commissioner were irrel-
evant to legality of the suspension and 
dismissal which, therefore, gave rise to no 
claims for violations of open meetings law. 
I I.C.A. 1953, 52-4-1 et seq., 52 4S. 
ClUM&*2P2d 
Willard R. Bishop, f\»dar Ot> f* *r plain-
tiff and appellant. 
John 0. Christiansen, County Atty,, Bea 
ver, for defendants and respondents 
Z1M> -UN, Justice: 
Appellant seeks reversal of a summary 
judgment rejecting his claim that he was 
wrongfully suspended and subsequently 
dismissed from his position as Beaver 
County jailer, that the proper Beaver Coun-
ty policies and procedures were not fol-
lowed in his discharge, that the state's 
open meetings law was not complied with, 
and that he was entitled to reinstatement 
and damages. We affirm the trial court. 
In 1976, Clarence E. Hutchison, appel-
lant, was hired as a deputy sheriff and 
jailer by the then Beaver County sheriff. 
Dale E. Nelson. Nelson later died and was 
replaced by respondent G. Lynn Cart-
wright. In May of 1981, Cartwright termi-
nated appellant's employment as a deputy 
sheriff, although appellant continued as 
county jailer. 
On February 11, 1982, appellant's deposi-
tion was taken in a civil action in which 
appellant was a named defendant. Appel-
lant's conduct at the deposition was mark-
ed by conflict with both the plaintiffs at-
torney and the attorney provided by Bea-
ver County to represent him. (The briefs 
and record are silent regarding the nature 
of the suit and the details of the conflicts 
arising at the deposition.) Five days later, 
after a meeting of respondent Beaver 
County Commission that was attended by 
Cartwright, Cartwright told appellant he 
was suspended from his position as county 
jailer. Three days later, Cartwright con-
firmed in writing that he had suspended 
appeflant, citing as justification relevant 
provisions of the Beaver County Personnel 
Policy. Those provisions outline available 
disciplinary procedures for county person-
nel and provide that an employee is subject 
to "immediate dismissal" for "[indulging 
in offensive conduct or using offensive lan-
guage toward the public or toward the 
County officers or employees." 
* \KiWKu.Hr t \ t : : . . 
m d.tah 1»4> 
In -irly March, following an investiga-
tion of the matter and discussion with the 
Beaver County Commission, Cartwright 
wrote appellant and stated that he was 
making the suspension permanent. In re-
sponse, appellant filed a formal grievance 
under the provisions of the Beaver County 
Personnel Policy for improper suspension 
and termination of employment, seeking 
reinstatement and payment of lost wages. 
The grievance was heard before the Beaver 
County Commission on April 1, 1982. All 
parties were present. Appellant was not 
reinstated. He sought judicial review in 
the district court for Beaver County, rais-
ing the same issues presented for our con-
sideration on appeal. The district court 
entered summary judgment against him on 
all claims, finding that all necessary proce-
dures for his suspension and dismissal 
were followed. 
[1] Appellant's initial contention is that 
the sheriff had no authority to dismiss him 
without cause and without the concurrence 
of the Beaver County Board of Commis-
sioners. This argument lacks merit First, 
the record establishes that appellant's mis-
conduct precipitated his dismissal. Appel-
lant failed to controvert Cartwright's state-
ment that he engaged in "serious conflict 
and argument" with counsel for Beaver 
County at the February 11th deposition. 
This Court has previously recognized that a 
sheriff may dismiss a deputy where the 
deputy "has been guilty of misconduct 
. . . . " Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 
429, 290 P. 358, 364 (1930). 
[2] Second, the sheriff ^ d authority it-
dismiss appellant w-tnout tne approval •>:' 
the board of commissioners. This issue 
was considered in Sheriff of Salt Lake 
Coun(ij v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783 
(1928). There the Court dealt with the 
question of whether county commissioners 
could suspend or dismiss deputy sheriffs 
against the will of the sheriff. In holding 
that the commissioners could not, the Court 
stated that unless otherwise controlled by 
statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is 
77f f'tah h M M ' ^ I M l KkPOKItR IrisKKIKS 
appurtenant to the power to appoint. 
When an individual is appointed by an offi-
cial, "the office is held during the pleasure 
of the authority making the appointment, 
and no notice or charges or hearings 
are required for the suspension or removal 
by the authority appointing the officer." 
71 Utah at 596, 268 P. at 784. In the case 
at bar, the authority to hire and to dismiss 
appellant for misconduct or other cause 
rests not with the Beaver County Board of 
Commissioners, as appellant argues, but 
with the sheriff, who had the authority to 
and did hire appellant as a deputy and a 
jailer 
13! Appellant next contends that wheth-
er or not the sheriff lmtialh had the right 
to suspend or discharge him. the sheriff 
voluntarily limited his authority by adopt-
ing the Beaver f oimty Pemoline! Policy as 
the internal puhcy >JL tin- sheriffs depart-
ment. Appellant arsrue* that the sher ff is, 
therefore, bour.o by those rules relating to 
discipline, suspension, and termination. 
Appellant's contention fails. While in this 
particular case the sheriff chose to utilize 
the Beaver County grievance procedure as 
a mechanism for adjudicating the issues 
raised by this termination, nothing in the 
record indicates that thi> was other than a 
one-time occurrence. No evidence before 
us even suggests that the county's policies 
and procedures were adopted and ratified 
either formally or informally by the sheriff 
as binding on his department in all cases. 
Nor is there anything in the record sug-
gesting that any county ordinance adopted 
by the Beaver County Commissioners made 
the policy applicable to the sheriffs depart-
ment The mere utilization of part of a 
county procedure by the sheriff in one par-
ticular instance cannot be equated with 
adoption of the entire policy of which that 
procedure is a part. Under such circum-
stances, we cannot say that the sheriff has 
relinquished his power to summarily dis-
charge. 
1. Tht* t tah legislature ha^ enacted a statute gov-
erning the hiring and firing of deputv sheriffs, 
and it appears to applv to the facts of this case. 
U.C.A., 1953. § 17-30^1 (1973 cd.). However, 
neither party referred to or relied upon the 
[41 Finally, appellant contends that re-
spondents failed to comply with the notice 
provision of Utah's Open and Publk Meet-
ings Act and that such failure gave appel-
lant the right to bring suit to void the 
action taken at an improperly held meeting, 
to wit: appellant's suspension and termina-
tion. U.C.A., 1953, § 52-4~€ (1981 ed.). 
However, because the sheriff had indepen-
dent authority to discharge appellant for 
misconduct or other cause, no action by the 
county commissioners was necessary for 
the suspension or dismissal to become ef-
fective. Therefore, any meetings held or 
actions taken by the commissioners were 
irrelevant to the legality of appellant's sus-
pension and subsequent dismissal. His 
suspension and dismissal gave rise U) no 
claims for violations of the open meetings 
law. 
For the reasons set forth above, we af-
firm. 
HAIL (\U STEWART, HOWL and 
DURHAM, JJ , concur. 
Darrell NIELSEN Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY, Board of Review, Industrial 
Commission of Utah, and Edward R. 
Beale, Defendants 
\ o 19169 
Supreme Court of I tah 
Nov 14 WS4 
On reuew of award of unemployment 
compensation, the Supreme Court held that 
statute in tht proceedings belou, therefore u-e 
cannot consider it on appeal. Bible v. First 
Motional Bank of Rawlms, 21 An? App M 515 
P.2d 351. 353 (1974); see. e.g., Warner i Ol*en, 
25 Utah 2d 366. 482 P.2d 702 (1971). 
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Evelyn RICE, Petitioner, 
v. 
SIOUX CITY MEMORIAL PARK 
CEM3TERY, Inc., et »L 
No. 2*. 
Argued Nov, 8, 9, 1954. 
Decided May 9, 1955. 
Action for damages for private cem-
etery's refusal to permit burial of plain-
tiff's alleged non-Caucasian husband in 
burial lot purchased by plaintiff under 
contract restricting burial privileges to 
members of Caucasian race. The Dis-
trict Court, Woodbury County. Iowa, ren-
dered judgment for defendants, and plain-
tiff ap:*-;-.! d. The Supreme- Court of 
Iowa, 60 NAV.2d 110. afiirmvd the judg-
ment, and p'ai'Hiff cbrair.ed certiorari. 
"47 U.S. 942. 74 S.Ct. tttS. S< L.Ed. 1091. 
The Supreme Court. 348 U.S. 880, 75 
S.Ct. 122, affirmed by a divided court, 
and plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. 
On rehearing, the Supreme Court, Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter, held that where it 
appeared that new Iowa Statute pro-
hibiting the denial of burial solely be-
cause of race or color of deceased would 
afford remedy in cases such as that at 
bar. certiorari would be dismissed as 
improvidently granted, even though full 
argument had been had. 
Order vacated and writ of certiorari 
dismissed, 
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent-
ed 
JL Constitutional Law C=209f 251 
Protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment can be invoked only if a state de-
prives any person or denies enforcement 
of a right guaranteed. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14. 
2, Courts C=397'2 
Supreme Court does not sit to satisfy 
a scholarly interest in intellectually in-
teresting and solid problems, nor for the 
benefit of particular litigants. 
3. Courts 0=397 4 
"Special aud important reasons'* 
within Rule relating to granting of cer-
tiorari, relate to problems beyond the 
academic or episodic, especially where 
issues involved reach constitutional di-
mensions. Rules of Supreme Court, rule 
19, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Seo publication Words and Fhrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
rvfi--vis of "Special and Important Rea-
4. Constitutional 'Law 0 4 6 U ) 
Supreme Court has duty to avcid 
decision of constitutional issues unless 
avoidance becomes evasion. 
5. Cemeteries C=16 
Violation of Iowa Statute prohibit-
ing the denial of privil-e-r oi :nr».m-::-.r. 
solely because of decedent's race or color 
gives vise to a civil action for dair/ac:--. 
as well as invoking statutory penalties. 
I.C.A. §§ 566A.1 to 566A.11. 
6. Courts 0=3974 
Where it appeared to Supreme Court, 
while considering petition for rehearing 
on review of Iowa Supreme Court de-
cision upholding defense based on pro-
vision in contract for sale of cemetery 
lot limiting right of interment to those 
of Causasian race, that recently-enacted 
Iowa Statute prohibiting the denial of 
burial solely because of race or color of 
deceased would afford remedy in cases 
such as that at bar, certiorari was dis-
missed as improvidently granted, even 
though full argument had been had. 
Rules of Supreme Court, rule 19, 28 U.S. 
C.A.; I.C.A. §§ 566A.1 to 566A.11; U.S. 
C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14 
7. Courts 0397»j 
Certiorari should not be granted ex-
cept in cases involving principles the 
settlement of which is of importance to 
public, as distinguished from that of 
parties, and in cases where the;re is a 
real and embarrassing conflict of opin-
ion and authority between Courts of 
Appeal 
[349 IY MEMORIAL 615 
On F^ution : 
Mr, Lowell C 
r petitioner. 
Kmuiif. >:OUH' City, Town. 
Mr-. Jesse E. M/WM. . . .- . . 
Iowa, for respondents. 
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Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER deliver-
ed the opinion of the Court. 
This is an action for damages brought 
by plaintiff, petitioner here, in the Dis-
trict Court of Woodbury County, Iowa, 
to compensate her for mental suffering 
claimed to flow from defendant ceme-
tery's refusal to bury her husband, a 
Winnebajaro Indian, after services had 
been conducted at the grave site and the 
burial party had disbanded. Plaintiff 
founded her action, so far as here rele-
vant on br<r;u-h nf a centred whereby 
defendant had undertaken to aiTord pL:*::-
tiff "Rltrht of Sepulture" in a specified 
lot of :ts cemetery. The contract of sale 
of the burial lot also provided that 
"burial privileges accrue only to 
members of the Caucasian race." 
60 N.\V.2d 112 
Plaintiff asserted that this provision was 
void under both the Iowa and the United 
States Constitutions and that recugni-* 
tion of its validity would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. By an amendment 
to the complaint, plaintiff also claimed a 
violation of the United Nations Charter. 
The defense was anchored in the validity 
of the clause as a bar to this action. 
After an abortive attempt to remove 
the case to the federal courts, D.C., 102 
F.Supp. 658, defendants moved to dis-
miss the amended petition in the state 
court. This motion was denied, except 
that insofar as the amendment to the 
petition had relied on the Unittd Nations 
Charter, the amendment was dismissed. 
Following Iowa procedure, the trial court 
entertained motions by both parties re-
questing it to adjudicate prior to trial 
points of law relating to the effect of 
the restrictive covenant. The Iowa court 
ruled that the clause was not void but was 
unenforceable as a .i n of the Con-
stitutions and public poiicy of Iowa and 
the United States. Nevertheless, 
it held 
that the clause "may be relied upon as a 
defense" and that "the action of a state 
or federal court in permitting a defend-
ant to stand upon the terms of its con-
tract and to defend this action in court 
would not constitute state or federal ac-
tion" contrary to the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. It again ruled that 
the United Nations Charter was irrele-
vant, and the case was finally dismissed. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirm-
ed, reasoning that the decision of this 
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1, 
68 S.Ct. 836. 92 L.Ed. 1161, when con-
sidered in conjunction with the In re 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 
i v 27 L.Ed. $:-.";. d:d r..-t i\.[t::re a state 
court to ignore such a provision in a con-
tract when raised as a defense and in 
effect to reform the contract by enforcing 
it without regard to the clause. The 
court further ruled that the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter "have no 
bearing on the case" and that none of 
the grounds based on local law sustained 
the action. 245 Iowa, 147, 60 N.W.2d 
110, 117. We granted certiorari, 347 
U.S. 542, 74 S.Ct. 638, 93 L.Ed. 1091. 
[1] The basis for petitioner's resort 
to this Court was primarily the Four-
teenth Amendment, through the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
Only if a State deprives any person or 
denies him enforcement of a right guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
can its protection be invoked. Such a 
claim involves the threshold problem 
whether, in the circumstances of this 
case, what Iowa, through its courts, did 
amounted to "state action." This is a 
complicated problem which for long has 
divided opinion in this Court. See, e. g., 
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 
207 U.S. 20, 28 S.Ct. 7, 52 L.Ed. 78; 
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 
397, 88 L.Ed. 497; Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152. 
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See, also, Barrows \ ] \vK -on, M6 VS. 
249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L Ed. 1586. Were 
this hurdle cleared, the ultimate sub-
stantive question, whether in the cir-
cumstances of this case the action com-
plained of was condemned by the Four-
teenth Amendment, would in turn pre-
sent no easy constitutional problem. 
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The case was argued here and the 
stark fact is that the Court was evenly 
divided. 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.Ct. 122. In 
accordance with undeviating practice, no 
indication was given regarding the 
grounds of this division. 
In addition to the familiar though vex-
ing problem* of constitutional law, there 
was refer* r^e in the opir/ons of the Iowa 
courts and in the briefs of counsel to 
the United Nations Charier. The low a 
language of this Treaty, which so far as 
the United States is concerned is itself 
an exercise of the treaty-making power 
under the Constitution, constituted a 
limitation on the rights of the States and 
of persons otherwise reserved to them 
under the Constitution. It is a redundan-
cy to add that there is, of course, no basis 
for any inference that the division of 
thib Court rejected any diversity of opin-' 
ion on this question. 
Following our affirmance by necessity 
of the decision of the Iowa Supreme 
Court, a petition was filed for a rehearing 
before a full Court, In our consideration 
of this petition our attention has now 
been focused upon an Iowa statute enact-
ed since the commencement of this litiga-
tion Though it was in existence at the 
time the case first came here, it \\aa then 
not seen in proper focus because blanket-
ed by the issues of ''state action" and 
constitution..! power for which our inter-
est was enlisted. This Iowa statute bars 
the ultimate question presented in this 
case from ana in arising in that State. 
In light of this fact and the standards 
governing the exercise of our discre-
tionary power of review upon writ of cer-
tiorari, we have considered am-w it>th~ 
er this case is one in which "there are 
special and important reasons" for grant-
ing the writ of certiorari, as required 
by Supreme Court Rule 19, 28 I'S.C.A. 
[2 -4] This Rule, formulated 30 years 
ago, embodies the criteria, developed 
ever since the Evarts Act of 1891, by 
which the Couit determines whether a 
particular case 
merits consideration, 
with due regard to the proper function-
ing of the limited reviewing power to 
which this Court is confined, decisively 
restricted through the creation of the 
intermediate Courts of Appeals and more 
largely confined by the Judiciary Act of 
1025. In illustrating the character of 
reasons which may be deemed "special 
and iinj tr:. .nC\ the Pwule rti\r> *^ '.ases 
a i-, utral qut 
d-
theretofore determined by this court, 
or has decided it in a way prob-
ably not in accord with applicable de-
cisions of this court." 
A federal question raised by a petit oner 
may be "of substance" in the senst th it, 
abstractly considered, it may present an 
intellectually interesting and sr>Vd prob-
lem. But this Court dors not sit to satis-
fy a scholarly interest in such i^ues. 
Nor docs it sit for the benefit of the par-
ticular litigants. Magnum Import Co. 
v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163, 43 S.Ct. 531, 
532, 67 L.Ed. 922; see also Address of 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, before the 
American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, 
69 Sup.Ct. v, vi; Address of Mr. Chief 
Justice Hughes, before the American Law 
Institute, May 10, 1934, XI Proc.Am.Law 
Inst. 313. "Special and important rea-
sons" imply a reach to a problem beyond 
the academic or the episodic. This is es-
pecially true where the issues involved 
reach constitutional dimensions, for then 
there comes into play regard for the 
Court's duty to avoid decision of consti-
tutional issues unless avoidance becomes 
evasion. Cf. the classic rules for such 
avoidance stated by Mr Justice Brandeis 
I 34'11 U S ] RICE v. SIOUX CITY MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY 
r it t i " 
in Ashvvandtr v- Tenru^see Valley Auth-\ 
ority* 297 U.S. 2883 341, 56 S.CL 466, 480,1 
gO L Ed. 688. J 
in the present case, certiorari wai 
granted, according to our practice, be-
cause at least four members of the Court 
deemed that despite the rather unique 
circumstances of this case Iowa's will-
ingness to enfoice this restrictive cov-
enant rtndtret] it ".fecial and impor-
tant" 
75 
We were unmindful at the time 
of Iowa's corrective legislation and of 
its implications. While that statute had 
been cited in the opinion of the Iowa 
Supreme Court, without quotation, in 
tangential support of a substantive argu-
ment, and while similar passing refer-
enees appear in respondent's briefs in 
o; p o t i o n to the petition and on the 
r ^ i v - it wa< in* *\,n c u : ; ^ + . 1 a> a 
j . tr' . : >v OII -i ivr t ^ r5 .- ir- "> 
] .rtaiue wa< r<«t put m luenuvirg per-
spective, and it did not emerge to sig-
nificance in the sifting process through 
which the annual hundreds of petitions 
for certiorari pass. Argument at the 
Bar was concerned with other issues and 
the even division of the Court forestalled 
that intensive study attendant upon opin-
ion-writing which might well have reveal-
ed the crucial relevance of the statute. 
[5] These oversights should not now 
be compounded by further disregard of 
the impact of this enactment when view-
ed in the light of settled Iowa law, not 
previously brought to our attention, con-
cerning its effect upon private litigation. 
The statute provides: 
"Section 1. Any corporation or 
other form of organization organized 
or engaging in the business under 
the laws of the state of Iowa, or 
wheresoever organized and engaging 
in the business in the state of Iowa, 
of the ownership, maintenance or 
operation of a cemetery * * * 
exer t * * * churches ir rL. 
ligious or established fraternal M> 
cieties, or incorporated cities or 
towns or other political subdivisions 
75 S Ct —3*4 
of the state ot lo.\a 4 * .rail 
be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter 
# i i i i i 
Ser 8 It shall be unlawful for 
an> organization subject to the pro-
visions of this chapter to deny the 
privilege of interment of the remains 
of any deceased person in any cem-
ett i y * * * sok ly b*c tuse 
78 
of the 
luce or color of such deceased per-
son. Any contract, agreement, deed, 
covenant, restriction or charter pro-
vision at any time entered into, or 
by-law, rule or reeulation adopted 
or put in force, either subsequent 
or prior to the effective dat* of this 
chapter, authorizing, peimuting or 
requiring any organization subject 
to *hc ;<ro\ ^icn- i thu- t;4*ptfr to 
utu-e ui iav.e or cOiur ui ^aui de-
based person is hereby declared to 
bi» null and void and in conflict with 
the public policy of this state. 
"Sec. 9 Any person, firm or cor-
poration Molating any of the pro-
visions of this chapter, shail, upon 
conviction, be pun^hable by a fine 
of not less than t\\tin\-fi\e dollar* 
($25'On» nor more than one hun-
dred dollars < $100 00). 
• # # * < 
"Sec. 12 Nothing in this Act con-
tained shall affect the rights of any 
parties to any pending htiration. 
"Approved April 21, 1953." Iowa 
Laws 1953, c. 84; Iowa Code Ann. 
§§ 566A.1 to 566A 11 
\$ X result of this Act, in an> other case 
arising under similar circumstances not 
only would the statutory penalties be ap-
plicable, but also, undnr Iowa 'aw, ytie 
in petitioner's position would be en-
titled to recover damages in a ci\il ac-
tion based on a violation of the statute. 
See Humburd v. Crawford, 12S Iowa 743, 
105 N.W. 330; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 
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14o Iu\va S3, 123 N W 2M, 124 S W. 
901, 27 L.R.A..N.S., 407; Amos v. Prom. 
Inc., D.C.N.D.Iowa, 117 F Supp. 615. 
Ha i Mir il.itu't' t f en 'y brought 
to our attention and n.v u»oe thereby 
put into proper focus, the case would 
have assumed such an isolated signifi-
cance that it would 
77 
hardly have been 
brought here in the first instance.1 Any 
adjudication of the constitutional claims 
pressed by petitioner would now be an 
adjudication under circumstances not 
promotive of the very social considera-
tions which evidently inspired the Iowa 
Legislature to provide against the kind 
of di-ciimination of which complaint is 
here made. On the one hand, we should 
hi^it^ie t«*> ] a.-s judcm^nt on Iowa for 
ur.v^n*titii?innal action, v * i\ such lu be 
uu::<i. wl en it ha3 already rtc'ified any 
possible error. On the other hand, we 
should not unnecessarily discourage such 
remedial action by possible condonation 
of this isolated incident. Moreover, the 
evident difficulties of the case suggest 
that, in the absence of compelling reason, 
we should not risk inconclusive and di-
visive disposition of a case when time 
may further illumine or completely out-
mode the issues in dispute. 
1. Ct. District of Columbia v. Sweeney. 310 
U.S. «U51. GO S.Ct. UK1, S4 LEd. 1402, 
where certiorari was denied "m view of 
the fact that the tax is laid under a 
statute which has been repealed and the 
question ?s therefore not of public im-
I>ortance." 
2. United States v. Rimer, 220 U.S. 347, 
31 S.Ct. 506, 55 L-Ed. 57S; Furness, 
Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn. 
242 U.S. 430, 37 S.Ct. 141, 61 L.Ed. 
401): Tyrrell v. District of Columbia, 
243 U.S. 1. 37 S.Ct. 301, 61 L.Ed. 557; 
Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Goodrich, 
245 U.S. 440. 3b S.Ct. 140, i52 L.Ed. 3N"»; 
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well 
Works. Inc.. 261 U.S. 387. 43 S Ct. 422, 
07 L.Ed. 712; Southern Power Co. v. 
North Carolina Public S«T\«*i»* C i.t 4Jt;;j 
U.S. 508, 44 S.Ct. 101. Ob L.Ed. 413; 
Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co., 204 U.S. 
314, 44 S.Ct 356, 68 L.Ed. 705; Davis T. 
Currie, 266 U.S. 182, 45 S.Ct. 88, 69 L. 
Ed. 234; Erie R. Co. v. Kirk^ndall, 206 
Such factors are among the many 
which must be weighed in the exercia* 
of that "sound judicial discretion" which 
Rule 13 requires. We have taken thia 
opportunity to explain their relevance, 
when normally, for obvious reasons in 
view of our volume of business, no opin-
ion accompanies dismissal of a writ aa 
improvidently granted, because of the 
apt illustration here provided of the 
kinds of considerations, beyond those 
listed by Rule 19 as illustrative but not 
exhaustive, which preclude adjudication 
on the merits of cases which may have 
the surface appearance of public in poi -
tance. 
[6, 7] We are therefore of fbe opin-
ion that this Court's order 01 November 
15, 1954. affirming by an equally divided 
Court the decision of the Iowa Supreme 
Court, must be vacated and the uri: of 
c t*rt :r*i\iri dismissed as improviciemiy 
^ : v ;LJ. TN re is nothing u:.UK*e T, „: 
such 
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dismi>sal even after full argument. 
There have been more than sixty such 
cases and on occasion full opinions have 
accompanied the dismissal.5 The circum-
stances of this case may be different and 
more unusual. But this 
79 
impre^ive prac-
tice pro\es that the Court has not hca-
'U.S. 1<*. 45 S.Ct. 33. 69 L.Ed. 236; 
Southern California EdNnn Co. v. Her-
minghaus, 275 U.S. 486, 4S S.Ct. 27. 72 
L.Ed. 387 ; Mellon v. MeKinley, 275 U.S. 
492. 4S S.Ct. 34, 72 L.Ed. 390; Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R, Co. y. State of Texas, 
275 U S. 494, 48 S.Ct. 82, 72 L.Ed. 391; 
Ellison v. Koswi*. 276 U.S. 598, 625, 48 
S.Ct. 320, 72 L.Ed. 724; Johnson v. 
Thornburgh, 276 U.S. 601. 48 S.Ct. 322, 
72 L.Ed. 725; Carter Oil Co. v. Eh, 277 
V.S. 573. 48 S.Ct. 435, 72 L.Ed. 994; 
St mdard Pipe Line Co. v. Commi>Mon-
er- of Index Sulphur Drainage Disk, 
27* US. 55S. 49 S Ct. 17. 73 L.Ed. 504; 
Si aboard Air Line R. Co. v. Johh-un 
(New York. Chicago & S t L. R. Co. v. 
< I ran fell) 278 L\S, 576, 49 S.Ct. 95, 73 
L.Ed. 515; Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. 
Saunders. 27S V.S. 581, 49 S.Ct 184, 
73 LEd. 51b, Virg'nian R. Co. v. K.rk. 
273 U.S. 582, 49 S.Ct 185, 73 L.Ed. 5lb; 
Wallace v. Motor Products Corp., 279 
U.S. 589, 49 S.Ct 21, 73 L.Ed. 522; 
Sutter y. Midland Valley R. Co.. 280 
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itated to dismiss a writ even at this ad- "If it be suggested that as much 
vanced stage where it appears on further effort and time as we have given to 
deliberation, induced by new considera- the consideration of the alleged con-
tions, that the case is not appropriate flict would have enabled us to dis-
for adjudication. In the words of Mr. pose of the case before us on the 
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unan- merits, the answer is that it is very 
imous Court: important that we be consistent in 
U.S. 521, 50 S.Ct. 05, 74 L.Ed. 500: 
Anglo & London-Paris Nat. Bank of 
San Francisco v. Consolidated Nat. Bank 
of Tucson, 2S0 U.S. 526. 50 S.Ct. S7, 
74 LEd. 593; Gulf. Mobile & N. R. Co. 
y. Williams, 280 U.S. 520, 50 S.Ct. SO, 
74 L.Ed. 593; Wisconsin Electric Co. v. 
Dumore Co.. 2S2 U.S. 813, 51 S.Ct. 214, 
75 L.Ed. 72S; Adam v. New York Trust 
Co.. 282 U.S. 814, 51 S.Ct. 214, 75 L.Ed. 
72$: Director* of Lands of Philippine 
Islands v. Villa-Abrilk\ 2^3 U.S. 7^5, 
51 S.Ct. 341, 75 L.Ed. 1413: Sanchez ?. 
Forms. 2^3 V.$. 7 K 51 S.Ct. 400. 7.", 
L.FA 1421; Kl-in. .T-.Ii-t vV E. R. Co. 
v. C;.':r.^ L:;!. L>4 V S. .*-!». "2 S.i't. l-'N. 
70 L.Ed. 50 s ; Suo\vd« n v. Koi Iiivt-r 
and Bayou Dos daises Levee and Drain-
age L»Ut. of Loiii>iana, 2^4 U.S. 592, 
52 S.Ct. IAS, T<» L.Ed. 510; Lang v. 
U:dt.-d Stai.-s. 2N» US. .'23, "C S.Cr. 195. 
70 L.Ed. 1207; Franklin-Anient an Tru>t 
Co. r. St. Louis Union Trust Co.. 2^» 
U.S. 533. 52 S.Ct. 042, 70 L.Ed. 1274; 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Parker, 
287 U.S. 509. 53 S.Ct. 94, 77 L.Ed. 501; 
Sevier Commission Co. v. Wallowa Nat. 
Bank. 287 U.S. 575. 53 S.Ct. 120. 77 L. 
Ed. 504: Fort Smith Suburban K. Co. 
v. Kansas City Southern 11. Co.. 2^S 
U.S. 567. 53 S.Ct. 85, 77 L.Ed. 513; 
B«»ynt..»n v. Hutchinson Gas Co.. 292 U.S. 
001. 54 S.Ct. 039. 7N L.Ed. 14<I4: Lyueh 
v. People of New York ex rel. Pierson, 
293 U.S. 52, 55 S.Ct. 10. 79 L.Ed. 191; 
Hunt v. Western Casualty Co., 293 U.S. 
530, 55 S.Ct. 2u7, 79 L.Ed. 03U; Fox 
Film Corp. v. Muller. 294 U.S. 090. 55 
S.Ct. 444, 79 L.Ed. 1234; State Automo-
bile Ins. Ass'n v. Click, 294 U.S. 097, 
55 S.Ct. 550, 79 L.Ed. 1235; Moor v, 
Texas & N. O. R. Co., 297 U.S. 101, 
50 S.Ct. 372, SO L.Ed. 509; Texas & N. 
O. R. Co. v. Neill, 302 U.S. 045. 58 
8.Ct. 118, 82 L.Ed. 501; Aetna Ins. Co. 
v. Illinois Central R. Co., 302 U.S. 052, 53 
S . C L 209, 32 L.Ed. 505; Tax Com-
mission of Ohio v. Wilbur, 304 U.S. 544, 
5s* S.Ct. 1030, S2 L.Ed. 151S; Goodman 
v. United States, 305 U.S. 57S, 59 S.Ct. 
303, 83 JLEd. 364; Goina •. United 
States, 306 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 783, 83 
LEd. 1027: McGoldrick •. Gulf Oil 
Corp., .309 U.S. 2, 00 S.Ct 375, 84 L.Ed. 
536; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Potter, 312 
U.S. 002, 01 S.Ct. 804, 85 L.Ed. 1109; 
Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Co.. 313 U.S. 541, 01 S.Ct. S40. 85 L. 
Ed. 1509; Jones v. City of Opelika, 315 
U.S. 782, 62 S.Ct. 630, S6 L.Ed. 1189; 
Gorman v. Washington University, 310 
U.S. 98, 62 S.Ct. 902, 86 L.Ed. 1300; 
McCullough v. Kammeror Corp., 323 
U.S. 327. 05 S.Ct. 2!>7. SO L.K.I. 273; 
McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U.S. 073, 65 
S.Cr. 120. so L.Ed. 547; Wl.it- v. Ba^u. 
324 U.S. TOO, 05 S.Ct. 97S. *!> L.Ed. 
134>- W.M„I> v. Ni.T-rh,-;riKT, 32< u s . 
211. tr, .v.Ct. 090. ;;O L.Ed. 1177; Phyie 
v. IMiffy, 3.34 V*. 431. OS S.Ct. 1131. 
92 L.Ed. 1494; I l^-ebeth v. State of 
North Carolina, 334 U.S. S00, OS S.Ct. 
l W i . 92 L.Ed. 1739: Superior Court 
of State of California v. Liih'floren, 335 
U.S. 900. 09 S.Ct. 410. 93 L.Ed. 440; 
Loft us v. People of ^tute of Illinois, 337 
U.S. 935. 09 S.Ct. 1511. 93 L.Ed. 1741; 
Parker v. Los Angeles County, 338 U.S. 
327. 70 S.Ct. 101, 94 L.Ed. 144; 
Ilammerstein v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia. 341 U.S. 491, 71 S.Ct 820. 95 
L.E.I. 1135; Sternbrid-jc v. State of 
Georgia. 343 U.S. 541, 72 S.Ct. 834. 90 
L.Ed. 1130: Edelman v. People of State 
of Calif..rnia. 344 U.S. 357, 73 S.Ct. 293. 
97 L.Ed. 367; Bcntseu v. Blackwell. 347 
U.S. 925, 74 S.Ct. 528, 9S IxEd. 1078; 
State of California ex rel. Brown v. St. 
Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932, 
75 S.Ct. 354. This list is not to be 
deemed comprehensive. 
Only in the light of argument on the 
merits did it become clear in these nu-
merous cases that the petitions for cer-
tiorari should not have been granted. 
In some instances an asserted conflict 
turned oat to be illusory; in others, a 
federal question was wanting or deci-
sion could be rested on a non-federal 
ground; in a number, it became manifest 
that the question was of importance 
merely to the litigants and did not pre-
sent an issue of immediate public signifi-
cance. 
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not granting the writ of certiorari 
except in cases involving principles 
the settlement of which is of impor-
tance to the public, as distinguished 
from that of the parties, and in 
cases where there is a real and em-
barrassing conflict of opinion and 
authority between the Circuit Courts 
of Appeals." Layne & Bowler Corp. 
v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 
U.S. 387, 393, 43 S.Ct. 422, 423, 67 
L.Ed. 712. 
Writ of certiorari dismissed. 
The petition for rehearing is granted. 
The order of this Court of November 15, 
1954, affirming by necessity the 
80 
judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Iowa is vacated 
and the writ of certiorari is dismissed as 
improvidently granted. 
It is soci'd'.ivi. 
Mr. Justice HARLAN took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this case. 
Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice 
DOUGLAS join, dissenting. 
We think th:.t only very unusual cir-
cumstances can justify dismissal of cases 
on the ground that certiorari was im-
providently granted. Our objections to 
such dismissals are stronger when, as 
here, a case has already been argued and 
decided by the Court We do not agree 
that the circumstances relied on by the 
Court justify this dismissal. We grant-
ed certiorari because serious questions 
were raised concerning a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Those 
questions remain undecided. The Court 
disTrusses the case because the Iowa Leg-
islature has provided that every person 
in Iowa except one who has already filed 
a suit can prosecute claims like this. 
Apparently this law leaves everyone in 
Iowa free to vindicate this kind oi right 
•except the petitioner. This raises a new 
question of denial of equal protection of 
the laws equally as grave as those which 
prompted us to take this case origintiu 
We cannot agree that this dismissal U 
justified merely because this petitioner U 
the only one whose rights may have been 
unconstitutionally denied. 
349 U.S. 81 
Robert Cecil BELL, Petitioner, 
v. 
UNITED STATES \>t America. 
No. 468. 
Argued April 21, 1955. 
Defendant was convicted of viola-
tion of the Mann Act and sentenced to 
consecutive terms on each of two counts 
of indictment. The United States Dis-
trict Court, Eastern District of Ten-
nessee, Southern Division, denied de-
fendant's motion to correct the sentence, 
and defendant appealed. The District 
Court judgment wa3 affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, 213 F.2d 629, and de-
fendant brought certiorari. The Su-
preme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
held that transportation of two women 
on the same trip and in the same vehi-
cle in violation of the Mann Act con-
stituted a single offense. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Minton, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Mr. Justice Reed dis-
sented. 
L Courts C=>383(1) 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review decision of 
Court of Appeals that defendant by 
transporting two women in violation of 
Mann Act, though on same trip and in 
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SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION i t l l 
No. 4087. 
Supreme Court of Arizona. 
June 19, 1939. 
1. Workmen's compensation $=»I027 
Where a widow who la entitled to com-
pensation has remarried and received a lump 
settlement of the compensation award, a le-
gal annulment of the marriage will entitle 
her to have the original award reinstated 
upon tendering back the amount she receiv-
ed as lump settlement 
2. Estoppel <§=*63 
Estoppel exists only when the party 
sought to be estopped, with full knowledge 
<>f all the facts bearing on the situation, 
:..k-'- a pusiti'>n wu.ch is iueon-L-t:-jnt With 
t«iie assumed later. 
3. Workmen's compensation C=>!027 
r* Lu.iri .oil and actApt«'d 1 .i*:p i^ ic*«.ii^  :.: ui 
rhe compens;Uion award in full release, such 
acceptance did not estop the widow from 
asking for a reinstatement of the original 
award after an annulment of her marriage. 
4. Marriage &=*l 
"Marriage" is a status created by and 
based upon a civil contract. 
[Ed. Note—For other definitions of 
•'Murrii.j.\M See W t : : s & P:.r«* c.J 
5. Marriage <§=»! 
The question of whether the status of 
marriage aetuaiiy exists depends upon the 
rules governing the making of the contract 
upon which the status is founded. 
6. Marriage C=M2 
The essentials of t valid contract, that 
the parties have capacity to enter into it 
and that they actually consent thereto, ap-
ply to a marriage contract. 
7. Marriage $=358(1) 
Under conruon law, where a marriage 
contract is proper iu form but is entered in-
to by parties wno have not capacity to con-
sent thereto, or who have consented in form 
but not in fact, the marriage contract may 
be annulled. 
8. Marriage C=>58(l) 
Where a statute provides for what caus-
es court may annul a marriage, court will 
look to the statute as the measure and lim-
it of its authority. Rev.Code IOCS, |§ 2100, 
2178. 
9. Statutes * » ! § » 
The word "void," in Its strictest sense, 
means that which has no force and effect, 
is without legal efficacy, Is incapable of be-
ing enforced by law, or has no legal or 
binding force, but frequently the word Is 
used by the Legislature and construed by 
the courts as having the more liberal mean-
ing of "voidable." Rev.Code 1028, 5 2178. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Void," see Words & Phrases.] 
10. Marriage $=>6 
Physical incapacity for sexual inter-
course usually does not render a marriage 
void, but voidable merely, and the marriage 
is re-carded as valid until regularly dissolv-
ed at the suit of the wronged party. 
11. Marriage 0=38(1) 
Tno W'-rd ••v.v.l," as u^d in «*?••?':• 
a",:htu"i?.in? annulment of m-.i.-r..'^ ' \\1...-
i». • i L . : n . . . ^ • < : ; ..i • " \ " . . " ; . . ' . • * 
in oases of physical incompetent*, to mar-
rinjres subject to ratification or disaffirm-
ance by the injured party, as well as to 
those which cannot be ratified. Rev.Code 
1028, H 21G6, 217a 
12. Marriage C=58(2) 
Und?r the annulment and dp'or^e ?!nt-
utc*s, physical incompetency is not a ground 
of a'n.uln: 'it, N:t u? di\or o oiJy. r« ".v.;. 
standing all oth»*r forms of vnn:a':ii#? mar-
rinses* are subject to annulment Kev.Code 
VJ'^% H 21CG, 217S. 
13. Workmen's compensation €=»I027 
Where widow entitled to compensation 
remarried and accepted lump settlement of 
th^ compensation award and later secured 
annulment of the marriage on ground hus-
band was physically incompetent, she could 
not have lump settlement set aside and 
award reinstated, since physical incompe-
tency of husband was not a ground for an-
nulment authorized by law aud court grant-
ing the annulment thereforp had no jurisdic-
tion to do fio. Kev.Code 1^-5, $5 ~1U>, -17s. 
Appeal by Certiorari from Industrial 
Con.r/..—.on. 
Proceeding under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act by Lorena O. Davis, ap-
plictant, against the Southern Pacific Com-
pany and the Industrial Commission of 
SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. IXOl'STRlAL COMMISSION 
f t P.M TOO 
Arix. roi 
Arizona, L. C. Holmes, Sam Proctor and voucher, for a small balance then due her 
Mortie Graham, as members of the Com- under the original award before her re-
mission. From an award of the Industrial marriage, and for the amount due as a 
Commission reinstating an award previously lump sum after remarriage. This voucher 
made in favor of the applicant, the South- showed on its face that it was made in full 
ern Pacific Company appeals by certiorari, settlement of the award. On February 10, 
Award set aside and case remanded. 1938, the voucher was endorsed by her, 
m „M . . T . presented at the proper bank, and she re-
Baker & Whitney and Lawrence L.
 c c i v e d i t s full face amount. 
Howe, all of Phoenix, for petitioner. 
Riney B. Salmon and J. A. Riggins, Jr., 
both of Phoenix, for respondent Lorena O. 
Davis. 
LOCKWOOD, Judge. 
Southern Pacific Company, a corpora-
Some five months later the beneficiary 
filed a complaint in the superior court of 
Maricopa County, praying for a divorce 
from Ray Earl Menefee on the ground of 
cruelty. About a month and a half later 
an amended complaint was filed in the 
same court and cause, seeking a decree of 
tion, the petitioner, has brought before us annulment instead of a decree of divorce. 
for review an award of the Industrial As grounds for her suit for annulment, 
Commission of Arizona, the respondent, 
reinstating a certain award previously 
rtade bv resworn lent in favor of Lorena O. 
Ur.vis the ber.viiciarv. 
The questions for on d e t c r m !*"!."; * :on are 
.rv for 
?: .:e trxm as follow^: On .\pril 14, 1926, 
William A. Davis, the husband of Lorena 
0. Davis, was in the employ of petitioner. 
On that date, and in the course of his em-
ployment, he received injuries resulting 
in his death. His widow made application 
to respondent for an award for the sup-
port of herself and children, and on July 
S, 1Q26, respondent awarded her the sum 
of Sol.42 monthly for her support, which 
payments were to continue urn! her death 
or remarriage. In the latter event she was 
to be paid a lump sum of $1,474.08, in final 
settlement of the award. There were sev-
eral minor children of the deceased, and 
an award was made in their favor also, 
but as they are now of age and their rights 
are not involved in the present case, we 
need not refer further to them. 
On January 20, 1938, the beneficiary in-
termarried with one Ray Earl Menefee, at 
Florence, Arizona. A few days after 
that date she advised petitioner and re-
spondent of the fact and in evidence there-
of delivered the latter certified copies of 
the marriage certificate, including the re-
turn of the person solemnizing the rites, 
and demanded of petitioner that it pay her 
the lump sum above set forth, in final set-
tlement of the award. The matter was 
presented to respondent, which approved 
such settlement, and acting under this 
advice and the request of the beneficiary, 
the petitioner delivered to her a negotiable 
she charged that Menefee was physically 
incompetent at the time of the marriage. 
and that such incompetence ha J c- ntir.uc-" 
up to the time of the commencement of her 
action: that before marriage he had as-
surrvi her he was competent; and that sh-
ccr.;r..c: c::c:7t t-.r h:s frau^e::: stau -
merits and assurances. On the 8th of 
August, 193S, the trial court granted to 
her a decree of annulment of the marriage, 
which reads, so far as material, as follows: 
"The Court, being duly advised in the 
premises, finds: 
"That the allegations of the plaintiff's 
complaint, all and singular, are true; that 
the plaintirT is now and for more than one 
year last past has been an actual and 
bona fide resident of Maricopa County, 
State of Arizona; that the plaintirT and 
defendant entered into the contract of 
marriage and the marriage ceremony at 
Florence, Arizona, on the 20th day of 
January, 1938; that there is no issue of 
said marriage; that there is no community 
property of the parties hereto; that at the 
time of said marriage of plaintiff and de-
fendant herein plaintiff was physically 
incompetent, and that said incompetency 
has continued to the time of the commence-
ment of this action; that defendant in-
duced said plaintiff to enter into said mar-
riage contract by fraudulent statements 
and assurances regarding his physical com-
petency ; and that said marriage was 
fraudulent in its inception, and therefore 
null and void. 
"Wherefore, it is ordered, adjudged and 
decreed: That the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing between plaintiff and 
defendant are hereby annulled, cancelled. 
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set aside and held to have been null and 
void; and that said plaintiff be, and she is 
hereby granted a decree annulling said 
marriage." 
This decree was never appealed from, 
nor brought before this court for review, 
nor was there any attempt made to set it 
aside in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Thereafter, and on September 8, 
1938, the beneficiary applied to the re-
spondent, tendering back to the petitioner 
herein the amount which she had received 
as lump settlement, as aforesaid, and ask-
ing that the settlement be set aside and 
that she be restored to her position under 
the original findings and award as it exist-
ed before her marriage to Menefee. 
Petitioner protested most strenuously 
against the setting aside of the settlement 
v : i the reinstatement oi *he awar4 , and 
the matter was heard before respondent. 
stating the original award which rcq ;ir-
w hereupon the matter was brought before 
us for review. 
[1] Petitioner raises several interest-
ing and novel questions of law for our 
consideration, and we deal with them in 
what we consider their logical order. The 
nrst is whether a widow to whom an 
~v,-ari ci rr. v/.thly compensation is made, 
.md who has received under our law a 
kimn ST:in in settlement of the original 
award upon a remarriage, may have such 
original award reinstated upon tendering 
back the amount of the lump settlement, 
if the marriage has been annulled by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
The question is a new one in this state. 
Xor have we been cited to many cases 
bearing thereon. The one nearest thereto 
in the factual situation is Eureka Block 
Coal Co. v. Wells, S3 Ind.App. 181, 147 
X.E. Sl l , 812. Therein an award had 
been made, as in the present case, of 
monthly compensation, and the widow re-
married. The marriage was afterwards 
annulled, and she claimed she was entitled 
to continued compensation as the widow of 
the original claimant. The court said: 
"Appellant points out that clause (e) of 
section 3S of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act (Acts 1919, p. 165), among other 
things, provides that 'the dependency of a 
widow » * *
 shall terminate with 
* * * her marriage subsequent to the 
death of the employeV and with much 
Earnestness contends that by reason of this 
provision of the act the marriage of ap. 
pcUec to McCormick, though voidable, 
nevertheless was a marriage which ter-
minated absolutely and permanently the 
dependency of appellee as widow of James 
E. Wells. We do not concur in this view. 
Giving the provision referred to a broad 
and liberal construction, as we must, a 
marriage, within the meaning of the stat-
ute, is not a void or voidable marriage 
which may at once be annulled, but a 
valid and subsisting marriage." 
The cases of Crummies Creek Coal Co. 
v. Napier, 246 Ky. 569, 55 S.W.2d 339, 
and Dodds v. Pittsburgh, M. & B. Rys. 
Co., 107 Pa.Super. 20, 162 A. 486. by in-
ference adopt the same rule. While in 
both cases last cited, the court refused to 
restore the original award of compensa-
tion, the opinions show clearly that it was 
because the marr.ages in both case? had 
not been Icci'ly annulled, and the implica-
tion :s that had the;. Ixeii, c :.. ~\^.;. 
would have been restored. We ly.ii. th r— 
fore. that '.\ht.n a w id-w who :s en*:*' . 
to compensation under the Arizona law has 
remarried and received a lump settlement 
of the award, a legal annulment of the 
marriage will entitle her to have the origi-
nal award reinstated upon tendering back 
the amount she has received as lump set-
tlement. 
[2, 3] The next question is whether the 
receipt of a lump settlement urder the 
directions of the respondent, with the un-
derstanding on the part of all panics that 
such settlement was in full release and 
satisfaction of all claims, estops the widow 
from asking that the award be reinstated 
after an annulment of her marriage. 
In the case of Eureka Block Coal Co. T. 
Wells, supra, which is the only one cited to 
us where the original award was reinstat-
ed after the annulment of the marriage, 
petitioner points out that the settlement 
therein was a transaction between the par-
ties, not made pursuant to an order of the 
Industrial Board of Indiana, and urges 
that had it been made pursuant to the or-
der of the board, the original award would 
not have been reinstated. We find nothing 
in the opinion which sustains this con-
clusion. Estoppel only exists when the 
party sought to be estopped, with full 
knowledge of all the facts bearing on the 
situation, takes a position which is incon-
sistent with one assumed later. In the 
present case, there was nothing except sur-
mise to show that the beneficiary had any 
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knowledge at the time she made her set- tal incapacity, or want of consent gcneral-
ticment of the facts upon which she later ly. Mattison v. Mattison, I Strob.Eq. 3§7, 
based her suit for annulment. Under such 20 S.CEq. 387, 47 Am.Dcc. S41; Di 
circumstances, we think the acceptance of Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 
the lump settlement did not estop her from N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92. 95 Am.St.Rep. 609. 
^kmg for a reinstatement of the original Such proceedings, being based on a defect 
award in the original contract, necessarily im-
This brings us to the question which was P U e d * Skiing t h a t *f ***™* ™« d i d 
most strenuously urged by petitioner at the a c t u a l ] y become complete, while divorces 
hearing. It contended, and still contends, a s s u m e * e original binding effect of the 
that the marriage was not, under our law, contract but cancel it for some breach of 
subject to annulment for the cause set t h c conditions. 
forth in the complaint, and that the trial [8] In most of the states, however, 
court, therefore, had no jurisdiction of the there are statutes which specifically set 
matter. If this be true, then the judgment forth the causes which will authorize an 
is void on its face and subject to collateral annulment of a marriage, and it is quite 
attack, and if there be no legal annulment generally held that where a statute has 
nor a possibility thereof, the marriage is declared jurisdiction in this respect the 
>till subsisting and the lump settlement court will look to the statute as the mcas-
niust necessarily stand. 
[4-7] Marriage is a'ntost ur.iversr.lly 
said by the authorities to be a "civil con-
}v soeakir.s-r. ir.4;ccur;ite. It may more 
ure and limit of its authority. Stierlen v. 
Stierlen. 6 Cal.Anp. 420. 92 P. 329; 38 CJ. 
1349 and cases cued. The Arizona statute 
STverning anrv::rr.er.t is contained in s^c. 
-ITS. K.C, l ' C \ which is in this lancuaee: 
t:;h l-.scd ur-on a civ:! c-:::rLv:;. Hd:c:i v. 
Rovlance, 25 Utah 129. 69 P. 660, 5-? 
L.R.A. 723, 95 Am.St.Rep. 821; 3S CJ. 
1273 and cases cited. Since it is founded 
upon contract, the question of whether the 
status actually exists depends upon the 
rules governing the making of the contract. 
Two of the essentials of a valid contract 
are that the parties have capacity to enter 
into it, and that they actually consent 
•.hereto, uiid !*":<»• i-j pr;r.c:T xs appiy :o Liie 
contract upon which marriage is based. 
It, therefore, follows logically that if a 
marriage contract, though proper in form, 
is entered into by parties who have not 
die capacity to consent thereto, or who, 
for some reason or another, have consented 
in form but not in fact, the marriage con-
tract may be set aside like any other one, 
on the ground that the essentials are lack-
ing. A judicial proceeding wherein it is 
sought to establish that a marriage con-
tract was lacking in some of its essentials 
is called an annulment proceeding as dis-
tinguished from one which admits the 
^r:g:na! validity of the marriage, but re-
quests that the contract be declared breach-
ed by some conduct on the part of one of 
the spouses which is inconsistent with its 
terms. Annulment proceedings under the 
-».mon law were, therefore, very gener-
ally based upon the equitable powers of 
chancery courts to give relief in respect to 
contracts generally in cases of fraud, men-
decree the marriage to be null and void, 
where the cause alleged shall be an im-
pediment rendering such contract void." 
It is urged by petitioner that under this 
section the only thing which will authorize 
a decree of annulment is one of the causes 
found in sec. 2166, R.C.192S. The section 
reads as follows: "Prohibited end void 
marriages. The marriage of persons of 
Caucasian Moo.], or their dcscer.datrs. wi:h 
Negroes, Mongolians or Indians, and their 
descendants, shall be null and void. The 
marriage between parents and children, in-
cluding grandparents and grandchildren of 
every degree, between brothers and sisters, 
of the one-half as well as of the whole 
blood, and between uncles and nieces, 
aunts and nephews, and between first 
cousins are incestuous and void. Children 
born out of wedlock, or the relations there-
of, are included within the prohibition." 
[9—11] It is contended by the benefici-
ary, on the other hand, and this theory was 
adopted by respondent, that the word 
"void", being the las: word of section 217S, 
supra, really means "voidable" and that 
her marriage was of that class. 
Petitioner insists that the only marriage 
contracts which may be annulled are those 
which cannot, under any circumstances, be-
come valid, while respondent claims that 
annulment applies not only to contracts of 
that nature, but to those which, though 
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lack:::cr the vital element of consent, may 
be ratified by the subsequent action of the 
party who did not originally legally con-
sent thereto. In the case of Kinney v. 
Lundy, 11 Ariz. 75, 89 P. 496, 498, we 
had occasion to discuss the meaning of the 
word "void" when found in an act of 
our legislature. Therein we said: " * * 
Upon the meaning and construction to be 
placed upon this word 'void/ as here used, 
depends the determination of the question 
before us. In the strictest sense 'void' 
means that which has no force and effect. 
The Century Dictionary gives the follow-
ing as its definition specifically, in law: 
'Without legal efficacy; incapable of be-
ing: enforced by law; having no legal or 
binding force.' * * * But the courts 
very generally have refused to accept this 
narrower, stricter construction as the one 
to he ad-r-ted as givincr proper eFect to the 
intent in the minds of the person or body 
m-'<:-<: uce of the word in lccrd documents 
or enactments, and have freer.-. utly con-
construction seems more nearly to conform 
to the probable intent in its use. * * * " 
The court proceeds to quote from many 
cases to this effect, and then continues: 
"Many other decisions of like tenor might 
be cited, but the foregoing are sufficient to 
su*>w that the courts generally recognize 
*r~: it is the common practice of bo'h 
lor:s1a*v.res and courts to rrs-ke u«e of the 
w.-rd 'vuivi' as interchangeable \vi*h, and as 
having the meaning of, 'voidable/ and 
*.v:*h subsMntially the same fnrre and ef-
fect; and that it is not only proper, but 
that it is the duty of a court to interpret 
the meaning of the word either strictly or 
more liberally as the intent shall appear. 
* * *»» 
To the same effect is the case of Yancv 
v. Jeffreys. 39 Ariz. 563. 8 P.2d 774. We 
must, therefore, determine whether our 
legislature, in section 2178, supra, meant to 
use *ne word "void" in its more restricted 
sense, which would cover only marriage 
c-n.t.acts incapable of ratification, or wheth-
er it really meant the more liberal term 
of "voidable", which would include also 
those subject to ratification at the will of 
the injured party, and if the latter be the 
C"ce. whether the letr-iature itt'ended the 
marriage of the benenciary to fall within 
the annulment statute. 
Paragraph 2110 of the Revised Statutes 
of 1SS7 dealt with the subject of annulment 
in the following language: "The district 
court shall have power to hear and deter-
mine suits for the dissolution of marriage, 
where the causes alleged therefor shall be 
natural or incurable impotency of the body 
at the time of entering into the marriage 
contract, or any other impediment that ren-
ders such contract void, and shall have 
power and authority to decree the mar-
riage to be null and void." (Italics ours). 
Paragraph 2111 of the same statutes 
states the causes of divorce. Impotency 
on the part of either party was not given 
as one of them. In that year then it was 
the obvious intention of the legislature 
that impotency at the time of marriage 
should be a ground of annulment, but not 
of divorce. It is also plain that the legis-
lature then did not intend to use the word 
"void" in the annulment statute in its strict 
sense, but rather meant "voidable", for 
physical incapacity for sexual intercourse 
usually does not render a marriage void, 
but voidable m-'-r-Jy, and the nurr ;a:re ;< 
r--:^.rde 1 ?.s v " : \ un'il re-zwlarlv e ;-t-d \ '. 
or herself wrontred. .Vartin v. Otis. 23?> 
Mass. 491, 124 N.E. 2'?4. 6 A.L.R. 1340; 
Kaiser v. Kaiser, 16 Hun.N.Y., 602; 
Briggs v. Morgan, 3 Phill. 325, 161 Eng. 
Rep. 1339; Bennett v. Bennett, 169 Ala. 
618, 53 So. 986, L.R.A.1916C, 693. 
Had the law remained as it was in 1S87. 
there could be no question that the legisla-
ture meant to make any voidable marriage 
subject to a::m:!m;nt, and that it r e o r -
nized physical impouncy as a pn<pc: 
ground for such a proceeding, and not for 
a divorce. In 1901, however, it again con-
sidered the subject, and substituted for 
paragraphs 2110 and 2111, supra, para-
graphs 3112 and 3113, of the Revised Stat-
utes of 1901, the first dealing with annul-
ment, and the second with divorce. It con-
tinued in effect the exact language of 
paragraph 2110, supra, with the exception 
that it removed therefrom the phrase 
"where the causes alleged therefor shall be 
natural or incurable impotency of the body 
at the time of entering into the marriage 
contract", and placed in paragraph 3113. 
which gives the grounds for divorce and 
not for annulment, the following clause, 
being subdiv. 2 of the paragraph: "When 
one of the parties was physically incompe-
tent at the time •:•; marriage and the same 
has continued to the time of the com-
mencement of the suit." 
The language of the statutes of 1901 in 
regard to annulment and divorce, in so far 
STATKv 
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as these matters are concerned, is identical 
with that of the code of 1928. We think it 
is clear that the legislature used the word 
"void" in our annulment statute as refer-
ring to marriages which were subject to 
ratification or disaffirmance by the injured 
party, as well as those which could not be 
ratified, including specifically in 1887, as 
a ground for annulment, marriages of the 
class to which that of the beneficiary be-
longs, but that in 1901 it determined, for 
reasons best known to itself, that physical 
impotency should no longer be a ground 
for annulment, but rather for divorce. 
[12, 13] We hold, therefore, that it is 
now the law that while all other forms of 
voidable marriages are subject to annul-
ment, physical incompetency existing at the 
time of the marriage and continuing to 
the time of suit is not a ground of annul-
ment, but of divorce only. As to what 
reasons the legislature had for this change, 
we cnnr.o; say, but it is very cvidcr.t that 
this was its intention, and the intent of the 
cas'J. the cause upor: which :he benehciary 
herein secured an annulment of her mar-
riage was not one authorized by law, and 
the court, of course, had no jurisdiction to 
render such a judgment. It necessarily 
follows that the beneficiary is still the 
wife of Ray Earl Menefee, and is not 
entitled to set aside the lump settlement 
which was made by her with the full 
knowledge and approval of all the parties, 
including- the respond-.:-.! herein. 
The award is set aside and the case 
remanded for further action. 
ROSS, C J., and McALISTER, J., con-
cur. 
[™w> 
STATE et at. v. ANGLE. 
No. 4078. 
Supreme Court of Arizona. 
June 19, 1939. 
I. Pleading <3=>2I4(I) 
Demurrers admit substantial allega-
tions of complaint 
1 Master and servant <§=>69 
Capitol gardeners, janitors, watchmen, 
and engineer were engaged In "mechanical" 
or "manual labor" within protection of min-
imum wage law, notwithstanding that their 
tefure and total annual compensation were 
91 P.2d—15 
ANCLE Art* 7<« 
not uncertain or fluctuating. Rev.Code 1928, 
| 1300, as amended by Laws 1933, c 12, | 1. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definition! of 
"Manual Labor" tad "Mechanical La-
bor/* tee Words & Phrases,] 
3. Master and servant 4=>69 
Whether workman la engaged In ••mech-
anical" or "manual labor" within minimum 
wage law depends on generally accepted 
character of any given type of work, and 
not on whether labor performed by par-
ticular individual has all the usual condi-
tions of the type, and it is the general cus-
tom and not the particular instance which 
determines the classification. Rev.Code 
1028, f 1350, as amended by Laws 1933, c 
12, f L 
4. States 0=>I32 
The principal purpose of financial code 
of 1922 was to prevent the incurring of any 
indebtedness in excess of the amount appro-
priated by the Legislature. Laws 1922, c. 
35. 
5. Statutes C=159 
A later valid act of Legislature super-
sedes all previous acts with which it is in 
conflict, whether or not it expressly repeals 
the earlier provisions. 
6. States S=>I3I 
A "general appropriation bill" can con-
tain nothing but the appropriation of mon-
ey for specific purposes, and such other 
matters as are merely incidental and neces-
sary to seeing that the money is properly 
expended for that purpose only, and any at-
tempt at any other legislation in the bill is 
void. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Appropriation Bill," see Words k 
Phrases.] 
7. States *=»I3I 
An attempt In a general appropriation 
bill to repeal prior general legislation is in-
valid. 
S, States *=>t3? 
A provision in the financial code pro-
hibiting state indebtedness in excess of 
money appropriated unless expressly au-
thorized by law was superseded by subse-
quently enacted general legislation fixing 
minimum wages for manual or mechanical 
labor, In so far as the two were in conflict. 
Rev.Code 192S. § 2618, and | 1350, as amend-
ed by Laws 1933, c. 12, | L 
9. States <£=>I32 
A provision in the minimum wage law 
requiring that certain wages be paid for 
Jr* If ! 5 1 • n.) 
r" -• -•» 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
BOYD A. WARD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation; RICHFIELD CITY 
COUNCIL, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah; KENDRICK 
HARWARD, individually and in his 
official capacity as Mayor of the 
Pichfield City Council; GLEN OGDEN, 
individually and in his official 
capacity as a member of the 
Richfield City Council; KAY 
KIMBALL, individually and in 
his official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
REX WARENSKI, individually and in 
his official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
DUANE WILSON, individually and in 
his official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
NAD BROWN, individually and in 
his official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; 
WOODY FARNSWORTH, individually and in 
his official capacity as a member 
of the Richfield City Council; and 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Civil No: C-82-0467W 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and the 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment were orally argued on May 
20, 1983* The plaintiff was represented by George E. Brown, Jr. 
C-82-0467W 
The defendants were represented by Ren Chamberlain and 
Richard Chamberlain. Following the hearing, the court took the 
matter under advisement and has since reviewed the memoranda of 
counsel and various of the cited authorities. Based on the 
foregoing, the court renders the following decision. 
Plaintiff in this case is seeking partial summary 
judgment on the first, second and third claims for relief in his 
complaint, which arise from his termination as chief of police of 
Richfield City in April 1981. Because of perceived violations of 
Utah's Open and Public Meetinqs Act, plaintiff sought to void the 
cityfs council's action relating to his termination. The state 
district court ultimately declined to grant plaintiff's requested 
relief because of S 10-3-911 U.C.A. which allows for removal of a 
chief of police without cause.* Plaintiff contends this statute 
does not pertain to a city of the third class, such as Richfield 
City. Plaintiff has further argued that his civil rights were 
violated under color of state law as a result of the manner in 
1
 Section 10-3-911 U.C.A. provides: 
Removal of department heads. The chief of police or 
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed, without 
a trial, hearinq or opportunity to be heard, by the board of 
commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the service 
will be served thereby. Its action in removing the chief of 
either department shall be final and conclusive and shall not be 
reviewed or called in auestion before any court. The city 
recorder shall forthwith notify in writing the removed chief of 
his removal, and it shall not be necessary to state any cause for 
removal. From the time of notification the person removed shall 
not in a$y case be entitled to any salary or compensation. 
C-82-0467W 
which the Richfield City Council terminated hin and by the 
complicating factor that the Otah state district court did not 
find it had jurisdiction to question the procedural manner in 
which the city council conducted its business in releasing the 
plaintiff. 
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the 
four claims for relief in the plaintiff's complaint* The 
defendants essentially contend that federal courts are not to 
redress violations of state laws under the Civil Riqhts Act, that 
plaintiff has suffered no constitutional deprivation of property 
or liberty, and that no actionable conspiracy exists* 
Looking to the plaintiff's contentions, it is apparent 
the plaintiff's principal claim is that the defendants have 
violated procedural safeguards in Utah's Open and Public Meetinqs 
Act in the process of terminatinq the plaintiff as chief of 
police. While this court finds a question of fact exists as to 
whether the Utah Public Meetinqs Act was violated, there is no 
Question that federal courts will not, under the Civil Rights 
Act, redress violations of state laws. The Open Meetings law 
establishes a state and not a federal interdiction. See e.g. 
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (mere violation of a 
state statute does not infrinqe upon the federal constitution); 
Atencio v. Board of Education, 658 P.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1981) (a 
breach of state procedural requirements is notf in and of itself9 
a violation of the due process clause; an action under the civil 
C-82-0467W 
rights statutes is not a plenary review of a challenged state 
administrative procedure); Ybarra v, Barton, 647 F.2d 891 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (state statute requiring hearing did not constitute 
sufficient predicate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to lack of 
property or liberty interest); and Dorsey v, NAACP, 408 P.2d 1022 
(5th Cir. 1969) (where rights are derived solely from state law, 
their deprivation is not subject to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983). Because this court finds it is without jurisdiction to 
entertain plaintiff's claims that state procedural safeguards 
were violated, a dispute as to exactly what procedure was 
followed by the city council does not preclude granting summary 
judgment on this issue. 
Plaintiff next maintains he has been deprived of 
certain constitutional rights because of his release or 
circumstances surrounding his release. Plaintiff contends not 
only that he had tenure, but that because he was terminated in 
such an unusual manner, an assumption is created that the 
plaintiff had committed an inappropriate act, since the city 
council consistently indicated the plaintiff had been a good 
administrator, but dismissed him for "internal problems" in the 
police department. As a result, plaintiff asserts he has been 
unable to procure employment as a chief of police in other Utah 
communities, though he apparently has been elected as constable 
for Sevier County. 
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To ascertain whether the plaintiff has been deprived of 
a constitutional right under the facts of this case, the court 
must find the city council's actions affected a property right or 
a liberty interest of the plaintiff* Bishop v. Woody 426 U.S. 
341 (1976)j Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71, 577 
(1972). Examining the property interest first, plaintiff 
contends he had tenure until the next election under § 10-3-916 
which provides: 
In each city of the third class and in each 
town on or before the first Monday following 
a municipal election the Mayor, with the 
advice and consent of the City Council/ shall 
appoint a qualified person to each of the 
offices of city recorder, treasurer and 
marshal. 
This court cannot agree with the plaintiff's reading of 
the statute. As applied to the present facts the quoted section 
only empowers a mayor to appoint a marshal, though this court 
does agree with the plaintifffs contention that the leqislature 
has not clearly set out the process by which a marshal or chief 
of police of a third class city is discharged. 
The defendant contends S 10-3-911 is the appropriate 
section for the release of a third class city's chief of police. 
Plaintiff argues that section only pertains to first and second 
class cities. While there is some indication the section can 
C-82-0467W 
only apply to first and second class cities,2 this court also 
notes that the use of the term "board of commissioners," rather 
than "governing body," may have been inadvertent, as the 
surrounding sections appear to be rather inartfully drawn. 
This court finds helpful the Utah Supreme Court's 
tangential look at S 10-3-911 in State v. Stavar, 578 P.2d 847 
(Utah 1978). Although it is not clear the court knew Helper, 
Utah, was a third class city, it is apparent the Utah Supreme 
Court had no reservations in indiscriminately applying 
§ 10-3-911. IcL at 848. See also, id., at 849 (Wilkins, J., 
concurring). This is understandable in light of prior provisions 
covering removal of a chief of police. Since 1933 cities of the 
third class or any city, for that matter, have been able to 
remove the head of their police force without cause. Taylor v. 
Gunderson, 154 P.2d 653, 107 Utah 437 (1944). There is nothing 
in the 1977 revision of the Utah Municipal Code to indicate to 
this court the leqislature's intent has chanced. Thus, under the 
law of Utah, this court does not find the plaintiff had a 
property interest in continued employment. As it is this court's 
opinion plaintiff's position as chief of police was terminable at 
will, without cause, plaintiff did not have a property interest 
2
 The term "board of commissioners" is defined by the Utah 
Municipal Code as being part of the governing body of first and 
second class cities; "city council" is used for a third class 
city. $£e SS 10-1-104(2) and (b); 10-3-103,-104,-105. 
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in continued employment and no constitutional deprivation could 
have occurred. See Bishop v. Wood, supra? Board of Regents v. 
Roth, supra. 
This court must also determine whether the plaintiff 
has been deprived of a liberty interest. It is undisputed that 
the following news release was formulated by the city council 
upon the termination of the plaintiff: 
In a meetinq between the Richfield City Chief 
of Police and the Richfield City Council on 
Thursday, April 2, 1981, Boyd Ward, Richfield 
City Chief of Police, was relieved of duty 
effective April 3, 1981. It was felt by the 
Mayor and the Council that internal problems 
in the department made this change necessary. 
The plaintiff also refers this court to a newspaper 
article which appeared in the Deseret News April 4, 1981. The 
article reads in pertinent part: 
RICHFIELD - Richfield Police Chief Boyd 
Ward has been relieved of his-post by the 
city Council. 
Mayor Kendrick Harwood was not available 
for comment Friday, but a Councilman said 
there had been internal problems in the 
police department along with criticism and 
letters to the editor in a local newspaper 
that led to the firing. 
The councilman praised Ward for his 
administration (sic) ability and "buildinq a 
fine police department," however. 
Ward declined comment on his firing. 
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The statement about the plaintiff being terminated for 
internal problems in the interview with a council member has, 
according to the plaintiff, caused significant damage in that the 
plaintiff has been unable to refute the accusation against him in 
order to find a new position as chief of police in another 
community. This court is aware that the Supreme Court held in 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), that the 
dismissal of a chief of police accompanied by charges that might 
damage his reputation, without the benefit of a hearino, amounts 
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Lookina 
to the undisputed facts of this case, however, it is clear to 
this court that this is not a case where the plaintiff's 
interests in liberty have been implicated. The council did not 
relieve him of his position as chief of police on a charcre that 
he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality, nor does this 
court see any indication whatever that the plaintiff's good name, 
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake. See Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. 
the plaintiff to be true,- under the Standards^«cpl^ 
Supreme Court this courtfind* 
arising from the actionah-of the-eity-covrff&rifc 
It follows that if there has been no deprivation of 
property rights or liberty interests, there can be no actionable 
conspiracy. It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action 
C-82-0467W 
for conspiracy under the Civil Rights Act where the acts 
complained of, and the means employed in doing the acts, are 
lawful* See e.g., 16 Am. Jur.2d, Conspiracy $ 49. 
In accordance with the above discussion, plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment is denied and the defendants1 
motion for summary judqment is aranted. 
' ntA 
Dated this If^— day of July, 1983. 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judqe 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named 
counsel this /f~*_ day of July, 1983. 
George E. Brown, Jr., Esq. 
430 Contour Plaza 
7001 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841070 
Ken Chamberlain, Esq. 
Richard Chamberlain, Esq. 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Secretary 
